This chapter takes as its focus one very specific example of public interaction with sci ence -the case of the hill sheep-farmers of the Lake District of northern England. They experienced radioactive fall-out from the 1986 Chernobyl accident which contaminated their sheep flocks and upland pastures. In an area dominated by a traditional and demanding hill-farming economy, they were restricted from selling their sheep freely (almost 100 farms are still under restriction). They also received intensive expert advice about the environmental hazards from the radiocaesium deposits, and the relationship of these to other such deposits from the nearby Windscale-Sellafield nuclear facilities and 1950s weapons testing fall-out. Fieldvvork comprising mainly in-depth interviews with affected farmers and others provided data for analysis of the factors influencing the reception of scientific expertise by this sub-population.
In May 1986, following the Chernobyl accident, upland areas of Britain suffered heavy but highly variable deposits of radioactive caesium isotopes, which were rained out by localised thunderstorms. The effects of this radioactive fall-out were immedi ately dismissed by scientists and political leaders as negligible, but after six weeks, on 20th June 1986, a ban was suddenly placed on the movement and slaughter of sheep from some of these areas, including Cumbria.
Although this shock was mitigated somewhat by the confident scientific reassur ances that the elevated levels of caesium in sheep, and hence the ban, would only last about three weeks, at the end of this period the restrictions were instead imposed indefinitely. The confident dismissal of any effects only two months earlier had changed to the possibility of wholesale slaughter and complete ruin of hill sheepfarms at the hands of a faraway stricken nuclear plant. At the time over four thousand British farms were restricted. The initially wide restricted area in Cumbria (which included about 500 farms) was whittled down within three months to a central cres cent covering 150 farms (see Figure 1 .1). These farms remained restricted, contrary to all the scientific assertions of the time. A later review indicated that they could remain so for years, overturning completely the scientific basis upon which the pre vious policy commitments were made (Howard and Beresford, 1989) .
Very close to this recalcitrant central 'crescent' of longer-term radioactive contami nation, almost suggesting itself as its focal point, is the Sellafield-Windscale nuclear complex. The stories of Sellafield-Windscale and Chernobyl are intertwined in ways which I now unravel.
Sellafield-Windscale is a huge complex of fuel storage ponds, chemical repro cessing plants, nuclear reactors, defunct military piles, plutonium processing and storage facilities, and waste processing and storage silos. It has developed from its original role in the early 1950s of producing purely weapons-grade plutonium into a combined military and commercial reprocessing facility which stores and reprocesses thousands of tonnes of UK and foreign spent fuel. It is by far the biggest employer in the area, with a regular workforce of some five thousand swollen until recently by a construction workforce of nearly the same size. It dominates the whole area not only economically, but also socially and culturally.
Scllafield has been the centre of successive controversies, accidents, and events relating to its environmental discharges and workforce radiation doses, with increas ingly powerful criticisms not only of allegedly inadequate management and regu lation, but also of poor scientific understanding of its environmental effects, and of the economic irrationality of the recycling option in nuclear fuel cycle policy. In the early 1980s the plant was alleged to be the cause of excess childhood leukaemia clusters; these excesses were confirmed in 1984 by an official inquiry chaired by Sir Douglas Black, which nevertheless expressed agnosticism as to the cause (Macgill 1987; McSorley 1990) . This controversy continues, with every scientific report &>"
• exhaustively covered in the local and national media (Gardner et al. 1990 ). The plant operators were later shown to have misled the Black inquiry, inadvertently or not, over earlier levels of environmental discharge of radioactivity. In 1984 the operators were accused by the environmental group Greenpeace of contaminating local beaches above legal discharge levels, and were subsequently prosecuted; and in 1986 they were threatened with closure after another incident and an ensuing formal safety audit by the Health and Safety Executive. Despite huge investments in public relations, they have suffered a generally poor public image for openness and honesty over the years.
Before most of these controversies developed, in 1957 the Sellafield-Windscale site suffered the world's worst nuclear reactor accident before Chernobyl, when a nuclear pile caught fire and burned for some days before being quenched (Arnold 1992) . It emitted a plume of radioactive isotopes, mainly iodine and caesium, over much the same area of the Lake District of Western Cumbria as that affected by the Chernobyl fallout. This fire and its environmental effects were surrounded by a great deal of secrecy. Although farmers in the vicinity were forced to pour away contaminated milk for several weeks afterwards, at the time they reacted without any overt hostility or criticism of the industry. Even in 1977 when they had the opportunity during a public inquiry to join with an emergent coalition of environ mental groups against a major expansion at Sellafield, the local farming population largely kept out of the argument (Wynne 1982) . Significantly, however, it was only after 1987 that the fuller extent of the Windscale fire cover-up emerged into the public domain. In 1990 it was revealed in a television programme that the ill-fated pile had in fact been allowed to operate with faults, which meant that highly irradiated spent fuel had been lying in the air streams emitted up the stack. Thus it was exposed that the fire had been a blessing in disguise for the authorities, since any discoveries of local environmental contamination could be attributed to the oneoff fire itself rather than to longer-standing management practices which had allowed routine uncontrolled radioactive emissions to occur for some time before. The paral lels with the Chernobyl is$ue nearly thirty years later are remarkable, as explained below.
The farming population in the Cumbrian hills is relatively stable, most farmers having lived through these controversies and events as near neighbours. Indeed many of them have relations, neighbours, and casual employees who also work at the Sella field-Windscale site. Not only is it close physically, it is also never far away from contemplation. Far from giving Sellafield-Windscale some welcome relief, the Cher nobyl emergency ironically brought it even more to critical public attention.
Scientific knowledge and social identities
At first, scientific advice was that there would be no effects at all from the Chernobyl radiocaesium fall-out. After six weeks these confident public reassurances were dra matically overturned when on 20 June 1986 the Minister for Agriculture announced the complete ban on sheep sales and movements in several affected areas, including
Cumbria (see Figure 1 .1). However, the shock waves from this reversal were con tained by the strong reassurances accompanying the ban that it would be for three weeks only, by which time radioactivity levels in lamb would, it was confidently expected, have reduced beneath the level at which intervention was required. This short ban could be accommodated because very few if any hill lambs would be ready to sell before late August anyway.
Yet after the three-week period, instead of lifting the ban the government announced an indefinite extension, albeit for a smaller area. This represented an altogether more serious situation in which the hill farmers faced ruin, because not only lamb crops, but also breeding flocks faced starvation and wholesale slaughter due to inadequate grazing. The government introduced a scheme to remove this threat: it allowed farmers to sell lambs contaminated above the limit if they were marked, in which case the lambs could be moved to other areas but not slaughtered until their contamination had reduced. This blight factor collapsed the market price for marked sheep, and many lowland farmers bought them and then made handsome profits when they sold them after the sheep had decontaminated on their farms.
The hill farmers were left in a quandary. If they sold, they had to run the gauntlet of the threatening bureaucratic system which had been established to manage the restrictions, which consisted of prior notification, tests and controls, and paperwork, and offered only a possible and partial future compensation for catastrophically low prices. If they held on to their sheep they risked ruin from starvation, disease, and knock-on effects, or from the costs for buying in extra feed. Yet, even after the initial contradiction of their scientific beliefs, the scientists advised farmers to hang on because, as they persisted in believing, the contamination would fall soon -it was just taking a bit longer than expected. When farmers did follow expert advice and waited, they found the restrictions continuing; once again the advice was badly over-optimistic, and had led them into a blind alley in which many costly compli cations to farm-management cycles had been introduced, and compensation was cut off because they had not sold within the prescribed period. In the circumstances it was not surprising that our interviews (see later) found many farmers bitterly accusing the scientists of being involved in a conspiracy with a government which they saw as bent on undermining hill farming anyway.
Through the troubled and confused summer of 1986, in spite of mounting evi dence and their own public embarrassment, the scientists persisted in their belief that the initially high caesium levels would fall soon. Only later did it emerge that these predictions were based upon a false scientific model of the behaviour of caesium in the upland environment. The prevailing scientific model was drawn from empirical observation of alkaline clay soils, in which caesium is chemically adsorbed and immobilised and so is unable to pass into vegetation. But alkaline clay soils are not found in upland areas, which have acid peaty soil. This type of soil had been exam ined, but only for physical parameters such as depth-leaching and erosion, and not for chemical mobility (Wynne 190, 2) .
Thus the scientists unwittingly transferred knowledge of the clay soils to acid peaty soil, in which caesium remains chemically mobile and available to be taken up by plant roots. Whereas their model had caesium being deposited, washed into the soil and then locked up by chemical adsorption, thus only contaminating the lambs on a one-pass basis, in fact the caesium was recycling back from the soil into veg etation, and thence back into the lambs. This mistake only became apparent over the next two years, as contamination levels remained stubbornly high and the reasons were urgently sought. What was not lost on the farmers, however, was that the scientists had made unqualified reassuring assertions then been proven mistaken, and had not even admitted making a serious mistake. Their exaggerated sense of certainty and arrogance was a major factor in undermining the scientists' credibility with the farmers on other issues such as the source of the contamination. In any case the typical scientific idiom of certainty and control was culturally discordant with the farmers, whose whole cultural ethos routinely accepted uncertainty and the need for flexible adaptation rather than prediction and control.
The structure of the scientific knowledge in play also embodied and, in effect, A graphic example of the scientists' denial of the specialist knowledge of the farmers was the scientists' decision to perform experiments on the value of the min eral bentonite to chemically adsorb caesium in the soil and vegetation, thus helping reduce recontamination of grazing sheep (Beresford et al., 1989) . The bentonite was spread at different concentrations on the ground in different plots; the sheep from each plot were then tested at intervals, and compared with controls on zero-bentonite land. However, in order to do this the sheep were fenced in on contained fell-side plots. The farmers pointed out that the sheep were used to roaming over open tracts of fell land, without even fences between farms, and that if they were fenced in they would waste (lose condition), thus ruining the experiment. Their criticisms were ignored, but were vindicated later when the experiments were quietly abandoned for the reasons that the farmers had identified. The farmers had expressed valued and iMisunderstood misunderstandings 27 useful specialist knowledge for the conduct and development of science, but this was ignored. Similar experiences occurred over other aspects of hill farming and the scientific knowledge relating to the management of the crisis.
In respect of both the 'conspiracy theory' and the 'arrogance theory' of science, the Cumbrian sheep-farmers felt that their social identity as a specialist community with distinct traditions, skills, and social relations was under fundamental threat.
These two models of science, which reinforced each other in the experienced threat to social identity, are mutually contradictory if taken literally. The former implies omniscience ('they knew all along that the high levels would last much longer than they admitted'); the latter implies unadmitted ignorance in science. This apparent ;
anomaly exposes the futility of expecting consistent formal 'beliefs' about science in research on public understanding; coherence lies at a deeper level, of the defence and negotiation of social identities. We examine this dimension next. be picked up by the vegetation-samples method, but not by the rainfall-data method.
In the manifest scientific confusion and inconsistency, it was as if the farmers had suddenly found an outlet for fears and suspicions that they had previously enter It still doesn't give anyone any confidence, the fact that they haven't released all the documents from Sellafield in 1957. I talk to people every week -they say this hasn't come from Russia! People say to me every week, 'Still restricted eh -that didn't come from Russia lad! Not with that lot on your doorstep.'
The scientific view was that the Chernobyl caesium depositions could be dis tinguished from the caesium in routine Sellafield emissions, 1957 fire emissions, or 1950s weapons testing fall-out, by the typical 'signature', in gamma-radiation energy spectra, of the ratio of intensities of the isotopes caesium 137 and caesium 134 (each isotope has a characteristic gamma-ray frequency or energy). The half-life of the caesium 137 isotope is about thirty years, while that of the caesium 134 isotope is less than one year, so the ratio of intensities of caesium 137 to caesium 134 increases with time. A typical Sellafield sample (from fully bumt-up fuel, usually stored for several years before reprocessing; or if from the 1957 fire, aged in the environment) would therefore show a greater ratio (about ten to one) than a Chernobyl sample consisting of fresh fuel and fission products (about two to one). Thus the deposits were said scientifically to show the so-called Chernobyl fingerprint, making an anal ogy with a form of evidence which is never questioned in law.
This scientific distinction, which exonerated Sellafield, was unequivocally asserted at public meetings and lectures with virtually complete consensus from scientists from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) and the other scien tific organisations involved in the issue, at least for the first year or more of the crisis. However, it too turned out to be less clear-cut than first claimed: it was later admitted that only about 50% of the observed radioactive caesium was from Cherno byl, the rest being from 'other sources', including weapons testing fall-out and the 1957 Windscale fire (House of Commons Agriculture Select Committee, 1988; Far mers Weekly 1988) . Nevertheless, at the time the difference in the fingerprints was represented as a very clear-cut scientific distinction, with Sellafield for once in the clear, and Chernobyl definitely to blame. Yet, although it was against their economic interests to entertain thoughts of a longer-standing but neglected (or covered-up) blight from Sellafield, and in the face of this solid scientific consensus, many hill I farmers were ready, at least in private, to implicate Sellafield. Their reasoning tells us a lot about the deeper cultural and social structures of expert credibility.
It was striking that when we asked farmers sceptical about the scientists' exoner ation of Sellafield to explain their reasoning, many of them talked about the 1957 fire and the secrecy surrounding it. At first we did not see this as an answer to the question, but then we realised that it was -they were explaining the lack of credibility of the present scientific claim about the Sellafield-Chernobyl distinction as due to the untrustworthy way in which the experts and authorities had treated them over the 1957 fire, and the longer history of perceived misinformation surrounding Sellafield:
Quite a lot of farmers around believe it's from Sellafield and not from Chernobyl at all.
In 1Q57 it was a Ministry of Defence establishment -they kept things under wrapsand it was maybe much more serious than they gave out. Locals were drinking milk, which should probably never have been allowed -and memory lingers on.
The farmers thus embedded their reading of the present scientific claim about the isotope ratio distinction firmly within the context of the unpersuasive and untrust worthy nuclear institutional body language which had denigrated them for thirty years or more. Their definition of risk was in terms of the social relationships they experienced, as a historical process.
They had a range of further reasons supporting this dissident logic. The empirical evidence of the maps (Figure 1 .1, and contrasts between Figures 1.2 and 1.3) was powerful as far as they were concerned; and official disclaimers were ridiculed with a heavy irony only evident in a personal interview, such as (referring to a MAFF scientist) 'she said she couldn't understand why the heaviest fallout from Chernobyl happened to fall around Sellafield'.
Thus the farmers gathered -and used -evidence which was drawn from science, including scientific inconsistencies on which the scientists themselves did not focus.
They entered the scientific arena in this sense, redrew its boundaries, and, operating with different presuppositions and inference rules, also redrew its logical structures.
Other direct empirical connections were drawn which may not have made scien tific sense, but which served to make a consistent explanatory picture to people who saw the science to be either politically manipulated or naively overconfident in its own certitude. Interestingly, the apparently unfounded notion that high deposits occur where 'the clouds' hit the fell sides is not unreasonable, because scientists themselves recognised the importance of intense 'occult deposits' of radio-isotopes direct from low-lying clouds and mists which are typical of the Lake District climate.
Other farmers seemed to be exercising a strong penchant for irony when they put into sceptical perspective the experts' claims about the 'coincidence' of Chernobyl deposition next to the local controversial nuclear site:
When you look at the stations around here, I said it was like a magnet, it just drew it in! [Then, relaxing the irony] I still think it was here before. They [the experts] won't have it ... We can't argue with them, but you can think your own ideas.
Often the justification for disbelieving the scientists on the Sellafield connection was simply that the same experts had very recently asserted, with similar confidence, first that there would be no effects of the Chernobyl cloud, and then that the restric tions which were imposed after all would be very short-lived. Since their selfconfidence had been shown to be misplaced on those counts, why should they expect to be believed this time, especially when no admission of the earlier mistakes was forthcoming?
The farmers scorned what they saw as the scientists' addiction to overconfidence and false certainty:
My theory, which is probably as good as anyone else's is this: we don't know .. It is important to note that scientific credibility was influenced not only by the evidence which alternative logical presuppositions could select and render coherent, and not only by the prior intellectual mistakes, but by the way they were handled socially. This gave impetus to the alternative constructs.
The farmers also came into direct contact with the conduct of science on their farms, as hosts to a proliferation of monitoring, sampling, field analysis, and various other scientific activities. Again, they soon noted the inconsistency between the cer tainty pervading public scientific statements, and the uncertainties involved in actu ally attempting to create definitive scientific knowledge in such novel and open-ended circumstances. The experience of watching scientists decide where and how to take samples, of seeing the variability in readings over small distances, noticing the diffi culty of obtaining a consistent standard for background levels, and of gradually becoming aware of the sheer number and variety of less controlled assumptions, judgements and negotiations that underpin scientific facts, corroded the wider credi bility of official statements couched in a typical language of certainty and standardis-ation. By accident, as it were, the farmers entered the 'black-boxes' of constructed, 'naturally determined1 science, and saw its indeterminacies for themselves (Latour 1987 The farmers drew similar conclusions from MAFF's response to their requests for pre-Chernobyl caesium data on the fell-top vegetation, soils, and sheep; they asked for these in order to test MAFF's assertion that there had been no significant contamination before Chernobyl. However, MAFF's reply was to refer first to an official document which contained only post-Chernobyl data (MAFF 1987) , and then to data which included pre-1986 monitoring on the lowland coastal strip, but still no fell-top data. The farmers saw this as evidence that the authorities were trying to cover up -either that they did have data which showed high fell-top levels of caesium before Chernobyl, or that they had no data at all! If the former, they were guilty of straightforward lying and conspiracy to conceal a longer-standing contami nation from Sellafield: if the latter, they were guilty of at least gross complacency and incompetence, but possibly also conspiracy to remain deliberately ignorant of the levels which prevailed before Chernobyl forced them to look. In addition, the 1957 fire had provided an ideal opportunity -apparently neglected -to have done the necessary research which would have avoided mistakes in the 1986 prediction: This indicates a belief that the authorities had done secret research, had found high levels and had decided to cover up -waiting for the chance, which Chernobyl pro vided, to pass on the blame. It also encouraged the farmers to conclude that they and their families had been used as mere objects of scientific research.
In fact the question of whether the authorities had done previous research in the Cumbrian fells, and thus knew that the radioactive caesium contamination would last much longer, is extremely complex. What counts as 'previous research' is itself open to interpretive differences; some ecologists we interviewed said afterwards that they knew, and told the government at the time, but that they were ignored by the 'physicalist' ethos which dominated the official advisory mechanisms. This is the subject of further research. In evidence to the House of Commons Agriculture Select Committee in 1988, a local environmental group, Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioac tive Environment, alleged cover-up, and also noted that the government's advisory body, the National Radiological Protection Board, had promulgated emergency refer ence levels for environmental radioactivity, only a month before Chernobyl, which completely omitted the central environmental medium and food chain in the Cherno byl emergency, namely sheep meat.
The feeling of being used for research rather than being assisted by scientific research was also reinforced by the offer which the authorities made to give people a whole body scan for radioactive contamination. This the farmers dismissed as useless information, being offered only so that the authorities could gather data, not to give people information they could use. Thus, whilst this offer was being made, the demand by the farmers for measurement of water-supply radioactive contami nation was ignored, even though this was information they could have acted on.
Again the scientists were exposed as ignorant or uninterested in local realities, this time imposing false assumptions about agency on local people. These modes of reasoning interlocked with other judgements which the farmers made of the con trolling institutions from which scientific claims were seen to emanate. Thus another farmer related what he saw as deliberate official ignorance to Sellafield's denial of claims that the site caused leukaemia:
The Department of Health could body monitor but they don't deliberately because if they did and found high readings then various ministries could one day be accused of irresponsibility in this regard. I think it self-evident that when BNFL [the Sel la field operator] were accused of being responsible for leukaemias they were quick to say 'what evidence is there?' I have been told that if I make an accusation that my grand daughter has got leukaemia in the future and I suggest it was due to Sell-afield they will say to me 'what evidence have you?' It is a deliberate policy of government not to do this appropriate monitoring and testing so that they can protect themselves against an accusation of this nature. 1 would suggest we have another Christmas Island situation. Of course we can judge that these views were encouraged by probably unrealistic ideas about what can be expected of scientific knowledge in a situation such as the post-Chernobyl emergency. Even allowing for this factor however, the expressed attitudes reflect a rich supply of evidence to support a model, which lay people held, of the subordination of science to untrustworthy institutional and political interests, and of a deep flaw in the very nature of science which drives it towards unrealism, insensitivity to uncertainty and variability, and incapability of admitting its own limits. (These can be seen as contradictory models of science, but are better treated as rhetorical stances which deconstruct and delimit the authority of the social control which the science represented in the experience of the farmers.) Analysis of the logical structure of the farmers' responses to the scientific expertise indicates both a far greater open-endedness about scientific logical structures and its institutional and cultural forms than is usually recognised, and a greater need to acknowledge and negotiate these as a condition of science's social legitimation and uptake.
Credibility: the social dimension
The way in which the farmers' scepticism was expressed suggests that Chernobyl acted to release a large unrecognised and unexposed historical backlog of more private disbelief, mistrust, and alienation of local people from the authorities, which related to Sellafield; and which alienation had been quietly simmering and growing over the years as one experience of official perfidion led into another. This would also explain the apparently abrupt change in their position from acceptance to hostility: it was probably not nearly as abrupt as it may have seemed, because there was already a finely balanced 'private' ambivalence, and not by any means as complete and uncriti cal an acceptance of the site and its expert apologists as a superficial reading of public quietude might suggest (Wynne 1987).
However, the dimension of this issue which drew in the farmers, and on which they had the most confidence to judge the outside experts and to criticise them, was the fact that, this time, expert responses to the crisis constituted massive inter ventions, disruptions, and denigrations of their normal practices and livelihood. The administrative restrictions introduced by the government to prevent contaminated lamb from reaching the market were tantamount to huge-scale social control and reorganisation, and denial of essential aspects of the farmers' social identity, to an extent that the outside experts and bureaucrats did not remotely recognise. The interventions required not only scientific understanding of the radioccology of caes ium in this particular physical environment; they also required this to be integrated with knowledge of hill sheep-farming methods and decision-making processes, in what is a highly specialist and particular kind of farming. That is, the complex natural and social particulars of the situation of use of scientific knowledge needed to be understood and negotiated into an effective hybrid with the scientific knowledge.
Whereas the hill farmers were quite reserved in their scepticism towards the scien tists on scientific matters, they were abrupt and outspoken about them when they saw the extent of the scientists' ignorance of hill-farming environments, practices, and decision-making. Even worse was the way that the outside experts did not recog nise the value of the farmers' own expertise, nor see the need to integrate it with the science in order to manage the emergency properly. An example which ruined the experts' credibility with many farmers was the advice given to farmers to keep their lambs a little longer on cleaner valley pastures so as to allow high caesium levels gained on the fell tops to decrease. This ignored the locally taken-for-granted fact that hill farming in such areas is organised around a severe short supply of valley grass, which would, as one farmer put it, 'be reduced to a desert in days' (and with knock-on effects into future breeding) if it were not very carefully husbanded.
Naturally the farmers felt that their whole identity was under threat from outside where the job has fallen down a lot. They couldn't understand that you were going to sacrifice next year's lamb crop as well. They just couldn't grasp that! Scientists and Ministry officials were often seen as indistinguishable; the most prominent officials explaining and defining official decisions were scientists. The organisational hierarchy within MAFF seemed to reflect such problems in that officials in the local Division at Carlisle, who did know and understand hill-farming culture, had no scientific standing, and so had little influence on the scientist policy advisers in Whitehall when they tried to act as a conduit for local farmers' knowledge.
But there was also a deeper structural convergence between the forms of monopolistic scientific representation of the issues, and the forms of centralised administrative intervention and reorganisation of farming practices. The significant elements of scientific representation in this respect were:
• its artificial standardisation of variations in local physical environment, farming conditions, and practices (hence farmers); and These dimensions of incompatibility and lack of mutual credibility existed at a structural level which was deeper than that of evidence and information. They lay at the level of moral, or cultural recognition. Each side only recognised, even as possible evidence, claims expressed within its cultural style. Thus, for example, the scientists had an a priori credibility gap to overcome when they stated things so categorically and universally, before the substance of the statement was even reached.
By the same token the farmers' expertise was not recognised because it was not formally organised in documentary, standardised, and control-oriented ways recog nisable to scientific culture; and their later claims for compensation encountered the inflexible bureaucratic demand for formal documentation, dates, prices, numbers, proofs, and signatures in a way which was entirely alien to their own culture.
This sense of being ensnared by an alien and unrecognising combination of science and bureaucracy was neatly captured in two typical comments:
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tices even within his own small valley, reflecting different microconditions, lamented:
'This is what they [the experts] can't understand. They think a farm is a farm and a ewe is a ewe. They think we just stamp them off a production line or something.'
Thus underlying overt clashes of knowledge, information, evidence, and belief were incompatible social and cultural structures, prescribed modes of social interac tion. The scientific knowledge, in the aggregation and standardisation of data and parameters by which it was organised, also expressed commitments about the levels of political standardisation and control of the farmers, and in effect prescribed an alien cultural mode for them. It was far from simply 'information' to either use or misuse.
Thus the scientific perspective was just as socially grounded, conditional and value-laden as the other. Its credibility was influenced not so much by what it said directly and explicitly, as in the way it was institutionally and intellectually organised, including lack of recognition of its cultural and institutional biases -its own tacit social body language. As explained later, it suffered from its own lack of reflexivity.
Analysis of this credibility gap allows us to identify factors which affect the social credibility of science. These are summarised in Table 1 .1 (see above), as criteria by which lay people rationally judge the credibility and boundaries of authority of expert knowledge. It is easier to understand the resilience of disputes over the authority of scientific knowledge when these several layers of the social and cultural framing of expert and lay discourses are recognised. They are structurally identical to the factors shaping the logics of dispute and development within science; it is just that in public situations the prior mechanisms of social closure are, by definition, less powerful.
This analysis suggests that reflexive recognition of its own conditionality is a pre-requisite for science's greater public legitimation and uptake; yet this requires more than an intellectual advance from science; it requires institutional reform of its modes of organisation, control, and social relations. This would involve, inter alia, recognition of new, socially extended peer groups legitimated to offer criticism of scientific bodies of knowledge from beyond the confines of the immediate exclusive specialist scientific peer group. The social definition of such extended peer groups would relate to the context of use of the scientific specialties concerned; and criticism would include explicit negotiation of the social criteria or epistemology of knowledge for the situation (Jasanoff 1990; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992; Knorr-Cetina 1989) .
This approach to public understanding of science therefore underlines the point reflected in other sociological analyses of scientific knowledge, that the boundaries of the scientific and the social are social conventions, predefining relative authority in ways which may be inappropriate, and which are open to renegotiation (Jasanoff 1987; Star and Griesemer 1989) . The practical process of developing that negotiation first requires recognition that existing approaches and discourse misrepresent this conventional character as if it were naturally determined.
Conclusions: lay reflexivity and social identities
A productive way of analysing the interactions between hill sheep-farmers and scien tists in this case, is to see each social group attempting to express and defend its social identity. The farmers experience the scientists as denying, and thus threatening, their social identity by ignoring the farmers' specialist knowledge and farming practices, including their adaptive decision-making idiom. They also experience the scientists as engaged in a conspiracy with government against hill farmers, initially to deny any need for long-term restrictions and later to claim an innocent mistake in predic tion -a combination of circumstances which influenced many farmers to make unfor tunate decisions and to lose heavily as a result. Coming on top of the further hard ships and external controls besetting the hill farmers in an area which is ;i tourist-dominated national park, their treatment by the scientists and bureaucrats after Chernobyl was almost the final straw in ;i baleful succession of blows to their cultural and social identity.
The scientists on the other hand were expressing and reproducing their intellec-tual-administrative framework of prediction, standardisation and control, in which uncertainties were 'naturally' deleted, and contextual objects, such as the farmers and their farms, were standardised and 'black-boxed' in ways consistent with this cultural idiom. Whatever private awareness they may or may not have had of the cultural limits and precommitments of their science, they successfully suppressed these.
These social identities were not completely predetermined and clear, nor were they immune to interactive experience and negotiation. My main point is that this dimension should be seen as the level from which explanation of lay responses to science is to be derived, and in which the factors and processes shaping credibility or 'understanding' can be identified.
The lay people in this case showed themselves to be more ready than the scientific experts to reflect upon the status of their own knowledge, and to relate it to that of others and to their own social identities. Thus, for example, the farmers implicitly recognised their social dependency upon the scientific experts as the certified public authorities on the issues, even if, as they indicated in interview, they held dissenting informal beliefs which they could defend along the lines described before. As one farmer put it: 'You can't argue with them because you don't know -if a doctor jabs you up the backside to cure your headache, you wouldn't argue with him, would you?', the suggestion being that when the expert tells you unbelievable things, you do not overtly argue, thereby inviting denigration. As another said: 'We can't argue with them, but you can think your own ideas. I still think it [the radioactive caesium] was here before.'
These more private beliefs were rarely displayed in public, and the farmers refused to confess to such overt dissent in media interviews. It was made clear to us that one reason for this was that the farmers identified socially with family, friends, and neighbours who were part of the Sellafield industrial workforce. They recognised their own indirect and sometimes direct social dependency upon the plant -not only neighbours, but also close relatives of the hill farmers work there. Thus, under lying and bounding their expressed mistrust of the authorities and experts, there was a countervailing deep sense of social solidarity and dependency -of social identi fication with material kinship, friendship, and community networks which needed to believe Sellafield was well controlled and its surrounding experts credible.
Thus social alienation and identification coexist in the same persons and communi ties, leaving deep ambivalence and apparent inconsistency in relevant beliefs and corresponding structures of'understanding'. These can only be understood by refer ence to the multiplex, not necessarily coherent, dimensions of social identities expressed in interleaved social networks and experiences. Whilst trust is a key dimen sion of 'public understanding' and perceptions of risks, it should not be reified into an objective entity. It is a profoundly relational term, a function of the complex web of social relations and identities.
All this could be interpreted as yet another example of the lamentable inconsist ency and impossible fickleness of lay beliefs. The conventional model of rationality would include a principle of cognitive consistency as measured against some canons of abstract logic. The 'rational' approach championed by modern scientific culture would assume inconsistency, imprecision, or ambivalence to be manifestations of intrinsic feebleness. However, we begin to see that such absolutist categories are actually moral or cultural stances, ones which assume control is an overriding value, yet without being able to recognise the cultural nature of this driving commitment.
What is revealed in this case is a deeper and more complex consistency in public reasoning than that recognised by such simplistic models. In the real world people have to reconcile or adapt to living with contradictions which are not necessarily within their control to dissolve. Whereas the implicit moral imperative driving sci ence is to reorganise and control the world so as to iron out contradiction and ambi guity, this is a moral prescription which may be legitimately rejected, or at least limited, by people. They may opt instead for a less dominatory, more flexible and adaptive relationship with their physical and social worlds. In this orientation, ambi guity and contradiction are not so much of a threat, because control and manipulation are not being sought or expected. This is no less legitimate a form of rationality than the scientists', and the 'public understanding of science' field needs to recognise this, and build upon it, in both research and in practice.
The advance from focusing on cognitive dimensions (often assumed public deficiencies) to trust and credibility is important. But closer examination in this case-study of the basis of trust and credibility falsifies the predominant analytical tendency to treat these as unambiguous, quasi-cognitive categories of belief or atti tude which people supposedly choose to espouse or reject (Renn 1991; Jupp and Irwin 1989; Jupp 1989) . My analysis suggests instead that 'credibility' and 'trust' are themselves analytical artefacts which represent underlying tacit processes of social identity negotiation, involving senses of involuntary dependency on some groups, and provisional or conditional identification with others, in an endemically fluid and incomplete historical process.
Thus what the hill farmers believed about the scientists and their assertions was rich in insights and refinement, on several levels beyond the one-dimensional reductionism of scientific logic alone. But this richness was also pervaded by an ambivalence reflecting their multiple and conflicting social networks and relations.
It would have been easy to have marked them down as mere 'don't knows' in a .more efficient attitude survey, even though this would have been a grotesque distortion of the true position. Indeed it is a serious challenge to large-scale survey methods to ask how they would have even identified these dimensions and whether they do not inevitably reinforce -normatively and conceptually -scientistic models of monovalent instrumental individuals.
Recognition of this multi-dimensional, even internally contradictory character of belief allows a more accurate perspective on the apparent fickleness of public responses to risks and scientific knowledge which is much lamented by authorities.
If we assume that widely observed lack of public dissent to expert reassurances equals (voluntary espoused) public acceptance, then an apparently sudden shift to opposition and rejection seems capricious, irrational, and uncontrollably emotive. (Callon 1986 ).
Thus the cognitivist presumption that risks, or scientific knowledge, exist indepen dently as an object for measurable public attitudes or beliefs, is left at least two steps behind. The first step is the recognition that the trustworthiness and credibility of the social institutions concerned are basic to people's definition of risks, or uptake of knowledge, and that this is reasonable, indeed unavoidable. Thus 'understanding' science is a function of experience, judgement and understanding of science's insti tutional forms as much as of its cognitive contents. However the second step is to recognise that trust and credibility are themselves analytically derivative of social relations and identity-negotiation; thus, like risk, they too should not be treated as if they have an objective existence which can be unambiguously measured and manipulated.
Having advanced the case for social identity as the more fundamental concept for explaining responses to science and risks however, it should be accepted that this term is itself not unproblcmatic. To claim that it offers more explanatory depth is not to claim it is empirically pure, coherent, and unambiguously identifiable.
The theoretical orientation of this chapter coincides with those perspectives which treat identities as intrinsically incomplete and open-ended, and as an endlessly revised narrative attempting to maintain provisional coherence across multiple social roles and reference groups (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1984; Giddens 1991; Shotter and Gergin 1988) . Beliefs and values are functions of social relationships and patterns of moral and social identification. This stands in sharp contrast to the taken-forgranted (and hence rarely articulated) commitment underlying conventional approaches, in which values and beliefs are taken to be coherent, self-sufficient, and discrete entities, and where social identities are simply the aggregate of individual beliefs and values. In this perspective social interaction is recognised only as an instrumental device to maximise preferences and values, not as an activity with moral and social meaning in its own right (Burke 1991; Bailey 1968 ).
The case shows the unacknowledged reflexive capability of lay people in articulat ing responses to scientific expertise. They are able to reflect on and develop their own social position as part of a 'dependent' response in which they are supposed to enjoy no powers of independent critical rationality autonomous from 'proper' assimi lation of scientific understanding. Indeed it is interesting that those who would be regarded as the representatives of traditional society showed this reflexive capability, whilst the putative representatives of enlightened modernity, namely the scientists, did not (Wynne 1993; Michael 1992) . The scientists show no overt ability to reflect upon their own social positioning, that is upon the latent social models which their scientific interventions imposed on the farmers. Perhaps the distribution of reflexive capability (or impulse) is itself a contingent function of social relations of power.
It is not true to say that scientists are not reflexive, in that they do show a capacity to reflect upon the nature of their practice, its contingencies and limits. However, this may (for all social groups) be brought about only by criticism and a related sense of insecurity, rather than by any intrinsic qualities of self-criticism.2 Thus the extent of such reflexivity in science is open to question, both in how deep it goes into examination of scientific founding commitments (hence identities) and in how openly such critical self-examination is expressed to other social groups, for example in public or policy debate. Such articulated self-criticism would display the uncer tainties in scientific knowledge, and at the same time expose as negotiable science's definition and role in relation to other social groups. As I have suggested in this chapter, ambivalence is usually treated as intellectual feebleness -the antithesis of rationality and 'clear thinking'. But it may be a necessary corollary of a social commit ment to disavowing control of others, in which case the remit of scientific rationality (as usually conceived) is seen in a radically different light (Harding 1986 ).
The issues and problems in public understanding of science thus cannot be div orced, as scientific bodies repeatedly assume they can, from the cpistcmological issues of the social purposes of knowledge, and what counts as 'sound knowledge' for differ ent contexts. These in turn highlight questions about the institutions of scienceits forms of ownership, control, and practice. To preclude these issues from public 5iM«gaas«sg^a^&5Bifr<Hfc4 4 BRIAN WYNNE debate is to undermine the possibilities of an effective public uptake and culture of science, and in this sense self-consciously scientific institutions are often their own worst enemy.
The intellectual properties of reflexivity or its lack (or to put it another way, of the epistemological principles of science) are not independent of the institutional forms of science. Thus it becomes evident why the quality of its institutional formsthe organisation, control, and social relations -is not just an optional embellishment of science in public life, but an essential subject of critical social and cultural evalu ation. It is a crucial missing part of the contemporary non-debate of science's social purchase and legitimacy.
